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Abstract
Cases the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursues against the directors
and officers of failed commercial banks for (gross) negligence are important for the corpo-
rate governance of U.S. commercial banks. These cases shape the kernel of bank corporate
governance, as they guide expectations of bankers and regulators in defining the limits
of unacceptable behavior under financial distress, such as risk shifting. We examine the
differences in behavior of all 408 U.S. commercial banks that were taken into receivership
between 2007–2012. Sued banks had different balance sheet dynamics relative to those who
are not sued in the three years prior to failure. These banks were generally larger, faster
growing, obtained riskier funding and tended to underprovision. We find evidence that
boards of failing banks respond to litigation by reducing the use of riskier funding in an
out-of-sample set of banks. Our results suggest the FDIC does set corporate governance
standards for all banks by suing negligent directors and officers.
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1 Introduction
What can regulators do to change the risk shifting behaviour of bank management? Fahlen-
brach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) show that some banks perform more poorly in crises. Banks
that performed poorly during the Russian debt crisis of 1998 also performed poorly in the
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009, showing long-run persistence in bank risk taking
behaviour or cultures. In both crises, banks that are more reliant on short term financing and
experienced higher asset growth are more likely to be a “bottom” performer. Whilst the regu-
lators can circumscribe the behaviour of banks through rules and regulations ex ante, it would
appear that they are unable to change persistent risk taking behaviour or cultures at banks.
Our contribution is to show that the FDIC, on an ex post basis, does punish bank manage-
ments who have engaged in risk shifting behaviour. When banks fail and they are placed in
FDIC receivership, the FDIC is entitled to pursue bank directors and officers for professional
liability claims for negligence. If the FDIC pursues bank management in negligence claims in
a predictable fashion based on easily observable characteristics of the banks, such as reliance
on short-term financing and asset growth, prior to failure, this sets the limits of acceptable
behaviour under financial distress for both banks and regulators.
We contribute to the empirical corporate governance literature on commercial banks by
focusing on an important mechanism for disciplining directors: the threat of legal action. Cor-
porate governance is concerned with the actions of the board of directors and their alignment
with the interests of the shareholders. The institutional framework of corporate governance
extends as far as shareholder litigation against directors and officers. Over 400 U.S. commer-
cial banks failed during and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009. Just over a
third of them saw Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) litigation against directors
and officers, a far higher percentage than during the last major period of failures of federally
guaranteed institutions, the S&L Crisis from 1986 to 1989, of 24%.
This paper empirically investigates the litigation strategy of the regulator (FDIC) when
pursuing the bank directors and officers of failed U.S. commercial banks. Is the FDIC primar-
ily interested in pursuing excessively risk taking banks? If the FDIC does indeed see value in
improving banks’ governance, it will pursue directors in a systematic fashion reflecting poor
governance. The directors and officers of U.S. commercial banks who are pursued for “negli-
gence” are indeed those who have engaged in risky behaviour such as risk-shifting. In order
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for litigation to serve as a deterrent to poor corporate governance, it must be possible ex ante
for directors and officers to be aware of potential financial distress. Therefore, we focus on a
list of financial indicators, the “directors’ dozen” (see Table 1) from the FDIC’s guide for new
directors, for evidence that the FDIC sues directors and officers for negligence that could have
been foreseen. In our robustness tests, we find that in out of sample banks that fail after 2012
Q2, the behaviour of banks appears to change, with less evidence of risk shifting such as a
reliance on riskier financing.1
Collecting data from the FDIC’s professional liability lawsuit list and professional liability
settlement agreements for banks that failed between 2007 and June 2012 we identify cases
of (gross) negligence that the FDIC chooses to pursue. The FDIC provides a list of failed
banks. 408 banks failed in this time period and 161 are subject to litigation against directors
and officers for (gross) negligence. We combine these bank failures and litigation cases with
data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council quarterly reports for the
fundamental financial data to replicate the “directors’ dozen” and other control variables. The
control variables fall into three categories: income statement ratios, balance sheet ratios, and
balance sheet dynamics
We employ three methods to analyse whether the directors of banks that fail who are sued
should be aware of the greater risk being taken. We visualize dynamic, univariate comparisons
of individual financial measures, contrasting banks that fail and whose directors are sued with
all other banks that fail. Secondly, we compare sued banks to other failed banks using a mul-
tivariate logistic regression including the ”directors’ dozen” with other control variables such
as bank size and the size of the loss reported by the FDIC. Thirdly, we run a Cox Proportional
Hazard model to predict banks that merely failed and those whose directors are sued from
within the wider population of all banks using ex ante available information.
All three methods concur that directors and officers of banks who are sued for (gross)
negligence should have been aware of the relatively greater risk taken by their institutions.
Banks subject to litigation are engaged in faster total asset growth, utilize more net non-core
funding (short term riskier deposits and loans) and appear to have underprovisioned. We also
find regardless of the recovery potential, there is no “too-small-to-get-sued”.2 We find that
1See Table 7.
2A “too-small-to-get-sued” effect represents the idea that the FDIC, limited in its resources, does not choose
to pursue smaller banks as the return on investment is low.
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the FDIC pursues a litigation strategy that penalises directors and officers of banks that fail
exhibiting risk shifting behaviour. Specifically, banks with higher asset growth and reliant on
short term riskier financing in the three years prior to failure. These are characteristics that
are found in the “bottom” performers of Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012)
The subsequent section 2 discusses corporate governance and shareholder litigation. Sec-
tion 3 describes the underlying bank level data. The next section 4 discusses our three empiri-
cal methods. After that we present our empirical results in section 5 and a range of robustness
checks in section 6. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Litigation
Our research is situated within a well understood phenomenon of risk shifting to benefit share-
holders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976) established why sharehold-
ers may choose to increase risk taking, such as risk shifting in the face of high levels of debt.
More recent papers such as Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) and Cheng, Hong, and
Scheinkman (2015) find evidence for excessive risk of banks taking during and prior to the
financial crisis. There is a substantial literature on risk shifting in banks. Esty (1997) demon-
strates that organizational form affects risk taking behaviour. Shareholders incentivise risk
shifting behaviour, while a mutual structure does not. Gan (2004) shows that banks that suffer
a loss in franchise value engage in risk taking activity. Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2015)
document that in response to a monetary tightening in 2004, sub-prime lender engage in risk
shifting as their franchise value declines. The observed changes documented in these papers
resemble the activity that leads to the FDIC pursuing directors and officers of failed banks.
Esty (1997) points to a dramatic increase in assets and Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2015) find
an increase in the risk of the loans made.
Within this context, we contribute to two distinct literatures. The first is the use of share-
holder lawsuits to influence corporate governance. The second is the corporate governance
specifically of banks. Our paper is the first to examine a link between litigation and subse-
quent changes in the corporate governance of surviving banks. When an insured depository
institution fails, the FDIC is appointed as receiver. The receiver’s role is to manage the assets
and meet the liabilities of the failed institution; it is similar to the role played by a trustee in
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bankruptcy for Chapters 7 and 13 under the US Bankruptcy Code. When the FDIC acts as
the receiver of a failed financial institution, it also gains rights, titles, and privileges that are
collectively known as professional liability claims.3 The actions of the FDIC as a receiver are at
an interesting nexus given its dual role as one of the three U.S. bank’s regulators and receiver,
thus acting on behalf of shareholders. In most cases, the FDIC will be acting on behalf of a
different group of shareholders in the event of default as the previous shareholders may have
been replaced by junior creditors, depositors or by the FDIC, “bailed in” as new shareholders,
with the old shareholders losing their claims, or facing drastically diluted claims.
The literature on shareholder lawsuits is primarily, but not limited to, legal literature: Cof-
fee (1986), Romano (1991), Hertzel and Smith (1993). The role of shareholder litigation in the
disciplining of directors is far more heterogeneous for non-bank firms since decisions cannot
so readily be linked to explicitly measurable indicators of competence. It is thus difficult to tie
the threat of shareholder suits to directors’ decisions and thus corporate governance. How-
ever, it is possible to show that litigation leads to shifts in corporate governance. Ferris, Jandik,
Lawless, and Makhija (2007) examine the effects of derivative shareholder suits on corporate
governance and find evidence that the suits lead to significant improvements in the board of
directors.
FDIC litigation pursuing officers and directors affects corporate governance via the impact
on the incentives of the boards of directors. The literature documents the impact of boards on
the performance of firms De Andres and Vallelado (2008) show that larger and not excessively
independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and
create more value for commercial banks. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) highlight the
importance of the board and the audit committee in preventing earnings management.
We know that executive (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) and particularly bank executive
(Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011) risk-taking is affected by individual-specific factors. Raviv
and Sisli-Ciamarra (2013) find that, in banking, the effect of those individual-specific risk fac-
tors differ between expansions and contractions. Yet, they find a role for regulation in adjust-
ing the risk appetite for banks. Clearly, the threat of being sued by the FDIC is an important
individual-specific risk factor and shapes banks’ behavior through their key decision makers.
Thus, the FDIC’s actions in receivership not only limit the cost of deposit insurance, but also
3See Receivership Management Program at https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/
receivership.html
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work in shaping the corporate governance of surviving banks.
In the realm of corporate governance literature on banking, many papers tackle the fi-
nancial crisis. Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) find that the poor performers in the
Russian financial crisis of 1998 and the Global Financial Crisis share certain common charac-
teristics: A high reliance on leverage and especially short term finance and faster growth.This
persistence in performance over two crises separated by a decade suggests that banks engage
in persistent risk taking strategies or cultures. Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) find in an in-
ternational sample that firms with more independent boards experienced worse stock returns
due to the raising of equity capital during the crisis and that firms with higher institutional
ownership took more risk prior to the crisis. Firms’ risk management policies have a signifi-
cant impact on the effect of the crisis on firms (Brunnermeier, 2009), and cost-benefit trade-offs
made by shareholders and boards determined the risk management policies (Kashyap, Rajan,
and Stein, 2008). This suggests that corporate governance affects banks’ performance.
The corporate governance of banks is complicated by the unique nature of banking (Mehran,
Morrison, and Shapiro, 2011). Banks’ debtholders, in large part depositors, are less concen-
trated and have low motivation to monitor the bank due to the government guarantee by the
FDIC.4 Not only are banks are highly leveraged5 and complex, but they also have multiple
stakeholders such as depositors, creditors, and the government itself. Yet, the board of the
bank, that is potentially subject to FDIC suits, represents the views of shareholders and not
other stakeholders, see for example Easterbrook and Fischel (1983).
At the nexus between bank regulators and corporate governance of banks, Macey and
O’Hara (2003) argue for explicitly forcing directors of banks to take cognizance of the effect of
decisions on the safety and solvency of the bank. Historically, bank boards have a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty to the corporation. In general directors are protected from ex post court
actions due to the Business Judgment Rule, requiring that directors must exercise ”ordinary
care” in conducting the affairs of the bank. If, during the most recent financial crisis, the FDIC
has engaged in cases against directors on the basis that in a period prior to the takeover by
the FDIC the board could have predicted financial distress, we would de facto be close to the
standard of care that is suggested by Macey and O’Hara (2003).
4For an excellent theoretical treatment of the theory of banking see Freixas and Rochet (2008).
5The average financial firm has 90% debt, and investment banks 95% debt (Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro,
2015).
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How do FDIC suits for negligence affect corporate governance? Legal action against board
directors acts in two ways. Firstly, it affects compensation of directors, as they may be finan-
cially liable for some or all of the damages and the costs of the legal action. Secondly, it has a
negative reputational impact, which reduces directors’ future opportunities to become direc-
tors and their earnings. The role of compensation in motivating agents is well established, see
Hölmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). Reputational concerns can
be found in Fama (1980) and are tested empirically in Gilson (1990) and Kaplan and Reishus
(1990), who find that poorly performing CEOs are less likely to receive external directorships.
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) examine the effect on directors’ reputations if they sit on the boards
of firms subject to shareholder lawsuits alleging financial fraud. They find that such directors
are more likely to lose their other board seats.
Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance is commonly purchased by corporations to insure
directors and officers against civil liability claims. Given the extensive nature of the D&O
insurance is it fair to assume that bank directors do not suffer financial penalties for poor
governance decisions?6 Firstly, in several cases the FDIC has successfully forced directors to
contribute to the settlement.7 Secondly, the threat of personal liability is taken seriously by
bank directors; a recent survey by the American Association of Bank Directors (2014) found
that 19 out of 80 banks surveyed had directors who had resigned due to a fear of personal
liability or had a person refuse to become a director for fear of personal liability.
3 U.S. Bank Level and FDIC Law Suits Data
Our empirical analysis combines publically available litigation data released by the FDIC as
well as panel data of regulatory filings on U.S. commercial banks. There are 161 cases out
of 408 failures. The cases are compiled from the FDIC’s professional liability lawsuit list8 of
6A substantial literature addresses the availability of D&O liability insurance and corporate governance. We
do not address this literature directly, although it is possible that the FDIC chooses to go after banks with more
D&O insurance. Baker and Griffith (2007) find that D&O insurers do not monitor the risks taken by firms and
the corporate governance of firms. This means that the directors, knowing that they are protected by D&O
insurance, do not engage in active corporate governance. This contrasts with Holderness (1990) who posited the
role of insurers as monitors.
7In the Downey Savings failure, Maurice McAlister, the former chairman, agreed to make a contribution
of $1.93 million, and other directors agreed to contribute a further US$1.7 million. This was small relative
to the D&O insurance contribution of $28.4 million. See https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/plsa/ca_
downeymcalisterrosenthalgatzke.pdf
8https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/
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Directors and Officers (D&O) cases and professional liability settlement agreements9 (where
there is a D&O participation in the settlement) to create a list of banks subject to litigation.10
We limit our analysis to banks that failed prior to June 2012. This is because the FDIC faces,
in general, a three year window in which to file cases.11 Our analysis focuses on FDIC tort
claims against directors and officers, avoiding other claims such as contractual claims or claims
against third parties.12 These legal actions are important because they are part of the corporate
governance of the firm and are not criminal charges or administrative penalties.13
The financial factors are based on the quarterly Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council reports on condition and income (“Call Reports”), Forms FFIEC 031 or 041 depending
on whether they have foreign offices. It is a requirement that in addition to the CFO of the
bank signing the report, at least two members of the board should co-sign, if the bank is a
state non-member bank, three directors have to co-sign for all other types of banks. The Call
Reports are required to be filed within 30 days of the quarter end. The Call Reports are thus a
reasonable basis on which to consider whether the board of directors should have been aware
of potential financial distress – as members of the board are required to attest to the correctness
of the report and that they had examined the report.
We adjust for the likelihood that a bank will be subject to litigation based on the level of
negligence that the FDIC must prove for their litigation. Some states have clear simple negli-
gence standards, whilst others hew to the gross negligence (or de facto follow this standard
based on the use of the Business Judgment Rule).14
Table 2 shows the number of bank failures and the number of banks sued over time. It also
shows the number of “tolling agreements” that allow the FDIC to extend the 3 year statute
of limitation on tort cases. The FDIC can ask for directors and officers to sign a “tolling
agreement” that suspends the statute of limitations, directors and officers cooperate due to
the severity of penalties and the possibility of out-of-court settlements, where cooperation is
rewarded, see Hildenbrand (1994) for a more detailed discussion. The mean length of time
9https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/plsa/index.html
10We do not remove cases where the case has come to trial and the defendants have won since our interest is
in what cases the FDIC chooses to bring.
11Lawsuits can be filed after three years if a “tolling” agreement is in place that allows the regulator to delay
the decision on litigation.
12See Bernstein, Oller, and Matelis (2009) for further discussion of financial institution litigation.
13For the criminal charges and the administrative penalties available to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, see OCC (2012) pages 88-105.
14Based on Stevens and Nielson (1994), updated with Stevens (2011).
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before a suit is filed is just under 2 years and 4 months (18 months excluding the tolling cases).
There are 25 tolling agreements; the mean length of these cases is 3 years and 10 months, with
the maximum being 5 years and 3 months.
Only 35% of failed banks have been sued, although this includes the past three years (57
bank failures) where it is still possible that cases will be filed, this dramatically outstrips the
percent share of failed institutions where the FDIC (and the Resolution Trust Corporation,
RTC) chose to sue the directors and officers in the aftermath of the S&L crisis between 1985
and 1992.15 Tolling agreements only make up 16% of all sued banks. It is clear that the rate
of sued banks declines from mid-2010, and given the mean time to the decision to file and the
relatively low proportion of tolling agreements, it seems unlikely that this number will change
substantially for the 153 failures between Q2 2010 and Q2 2012.
Table 3 shows a summary of the failed and sued banks relative to the wider population
of banks and their regulators. FDIC regulates banks which are state chartered, but not part
of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulates
federally chartered banks and the Federal Reserve regulates state chartered banks that are part
of the Federal Reserve System. It would appear that smaller state chartered banks that are not
part of the Federal Reserve System are disproportionately more likely to fail and be sued, yet
no systematic relationship between the regulator and the failed and sued banks exists.
Table 4 shows financial data, such as the “director’s dozen” and other characteristics used
in the multivariate analyis, on the wider universe of banks in Q1 2007 and Q1 2015 and for
failed and sued banks. We can see that there is substantial variation in the wider universe
over time as the effect of the Global Financial Crisis lowers asset growth rates. The banks that
fail and are not sued appear to be similar in size to the wider universe of banks, while those
that fail and are sued are slightly larger in terms of log assets. Reliance on riskier short term
financing (net non-core funding dependence) is substantially higher for failed and sued banks
than the wider universe.
15https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/
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4 Empirical Methods
The FDIC is the most likely litigant against directors and officers. The standard of proof re-
quired by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
is of gross negligence. From the experience of civil cases against S&Ls, the FDIC set out the
following criteria: “No claim is pursued by the FDIC unless it meets both requirements of a
two part test. First, the claim must be sound on its merits, and the receiver must be more than
likely to succeed in any litigation necessary to collect on the claim. Second, it must be cost ef-
fective, considering liability insurance coverage and personal assets held by the defendant.”16
What is meant by “likely to succeed”? Essentially, that the agents must breach a duty of
care. Outside directors are not meant to be second guessed by the regulator ex post and the
Business Judgment Rule applies: “Directors and officers are generally protected from liability
if they have acted in good faith and with due care, and if they have made fully informed
business decisions within the scope of their authority and without personal interest or self-
dealing.”17
Our hypothesis is that the FDIC pursues banks taking excessive risks. It is thus imposing a
retrospective duty of care to deposit holders and a requirement that the directors and officers
focus on the safety and stability of the financial institution. The null hypothesis is that of no
difference, other than bank size or the FDIC loss, between cases where directors and officers
are sued and where they were not.
To investigate this hypothesis we conduct a series of tests. First, we compare balance sheet
ratio means in the run-up of the failure between banks subject to litigation and failed banks
whose directors and officers did not get sued. Second, we estimate a logistic model among
the population of all failed banks to seek characteristics that, conditional on failing, would
predict whether or not the FDIC pursues litigation against directors and officers. Third, we
estimate a Cox proportional hazard model on the population of U.S. commercial banks to test
whether failure and litigation by the FDIC are unconditionally predictable. For all three tests,
we employ a subset of the “directors’ dozen” of monitoring tools given by the FDIC.18
16FDIC (1998) Managing the crisis.
17FDIC (1998) p. 275 and FDIC Financial Institution Letter (FIL-87-92) note 5.
18FDIC “New Director Guidance” presentation from NY FDIC Director’s college. Slide 19.
Downloaded from https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/college/ny/materials/
2012-New-Directors.pdf. These are more detailed measures based on the Pocket Guide for Directors found at:
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/pocket/index.html
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The first test consists of indexing the calendar time balance sheet dynamics relative to
failure time (t = 0) and statistically testing differences in the run-up dynamics of important
balance sheet ratios prior to failure. We visualize moments of those ratios and statistically test
for difference in the means of the banks that (failed and) were sued against those that (merely)
failed, but did not become subject to litigation.
Second, an important disadvantage of the failure-time indexed mean comparisons is that
they are univariate. Thus, we employ a multivariate nonlinear logistic regression to simulta-
neously control for multiple balance sheet characteristics as well as other factors such as time
and the different U.S. state-level standards for litigation. We also include the (log of) bank
total assets as well as FDIC loss. Using the same time horizon as in the univariate failure-time
indexed mean comparisons, we estimate the logistic model in the twelve quarters prior to the
failure of a bank.
Third and finally, the previous two tests confined themselves to the universe of failed
commercial banks, thus all estimates were conditional on failing. In our final test, we estimate
a Cox proportional hazard model with the bank level characteristics normalized by the mean
and standard deviation of the respective quarter. So in each quarter, the expected value is zero
to circumvent the problem of macroeconomic environment-induced simultaneous changes in
balance sheets of all banks and focus on the within quarter – “peer group” – variation.
Our analysis is part of the larger financial distress literature (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szi-
lagyi, 2008). The broader econometric approach follows Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow
(2004), and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) using a dynamic panel model with a logit
specification. In particular, our methods build on an extensive literature on bank failure pre-
diction. Desai, Rajgopal, and Yu (2013) specifically ask whether financial statement indicators
predict failure during the financial crisis. They find that many traditional measures that pre-
dict failure continue to be informative. They build on the work of the FDIC (1997), which
focuses on the loan-to-asset ratio, Liu and Ryan (1995), the non-performing loans to total loans
(NPL) and the composition of the loan portfolio. Flannery and James (1984) and Avery and
Berger (1991) capture interest rate risk using the short term maturity mismatch of banks’ as-
sets and liabilities. González-Hermosillo (1999) uses the ratio of large certificates of deposit
($100,000 or more) to total deposits to capture liquidity risk.
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5 What Predicts Litigation?
All three tests discussed in section 4 find evidence that the FDIC has pursued banks engaged
in excessive risk shifting. We find a material difference between the banks whose directors
and officers are sued and the ones that are not. We find evidence that the banks subject to
FDIC litigation are the ones that were more risk-taking, underprovisioning for losses, and
more aggressively pursuing asset growth with riskier funding sources. In terms of timing,
excessive risk shifting appears to have commenced approximately two to three years prior to
failure.
Univariate Mean Difference
Figures 1 – 10 illustrate the dynamics of important “directors’ dozen” measures in the three
years (twelve quarters) preceding failure. Distinct patterns for failed and sued commercial
banks emerge.
Figures 1 – 3 demonstrate differences in risk-taking behavior. Figure 1 shows net non-core
funding rises for sued banks and those banks that relied substantially more on non-deposit
funding (commercial paper and borrowing minus short term investments). The bottom panel
of the figure illustrates this difference becoming statistically significant from the eighth quarter
prior to failure. This extra funding helps to finance asset growth in Figure 2. Note that for the
final eight quarters the asset growth rate of sued banks is statistically significantly different
from that of failed, but not sued banks. Figure 3 shows short term liquidity (bank deposits
and cash equivalents), and we see an inversion between failed and sued banks in ten quarters
prior to failure and a statistically significant difference from eight quarters prior to failure.
Figure 4 and 5 show the results of this risk-taking behavior. The expansion is followed
by a gradual deterioration in the performance of the banks that are sued. Figure 4 illustrates
that their net interest income ratio (interest income – interest expense) inverts with sued banks
seeing their income fall dramatically four quarters prior to failure. Sued banks, having previ-
ously had net interest income above that of failed banks have statistically significantly lower
interest income ratios three quarters prior to failure. This is reflected in the deterioration of
the return on assets (net profits divided by total assets, ROA in the following) – Figure 5 –
for sued banks, which having been higher than that of non-sued banks, deteriorates from four
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to five quarters before failure, becoming statistically indistinguishable two quarters prior to
failure.
Yet, sued banks give the appearance of being more financially robust, with Figure 6 show-
ing that sued banks have significantly higher Tier 1 capital ratios and Figure 7 showing lower
non-current loans ratios. It is especially noticeable in the period between quarters eight and
two prior to bankruptcy when the sued banks Tier 1 capital appears to be statistically signifi-
cantly higher than that of failed banks. It seems likely that the aggressive expansion of failed,
sued banks documented in Figure 2 might have delayed recognition of the problem.
In addition, another form of excessive risk taking, persistent underprovisioning, might have
played a part. Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the sudden deterioration of sued banks just in the last
year prior to failure. Figure 8 shows provisions for loan losses rising dramatically for sued
banks, with an inversion between sued and failed banks four quarters prior to bankruptcy.
Allowances for loan losse s converge between sued and failed banks the third quarter prior
to failure. Net charge-offs in Figure 10 show an inversion in the period between one and two
quarters prior to bankruptcy.
These univariate results suggest the FDIC is indeed pursuing the “right” directors and
officers insofar as the banks being sued likely have been following a risk shifting strategy.
Logistic Regression
How robust are the univariate failure-indexed mean comparisons? The multivariate logistic
regression results reported in Table 5 confirm the results of the univariate mean comparisons.
The table shows that the FDIC is aiming specifically at directors who should have been able
to determine that their institution was running significant risks at least a year or two prior to
failure.
The logistic estimation includes time, regulator and U.S. state negligence standard fixed
effects. The time fixed effects remove the effect of calendar time from the analysis. Relative
to other banks that fail, but are not sued, we continue to find evidence that directors engaged
in riskier strategies – delaying recognition of poor quality assets and relying more on non-
core funding. We can see that the FDIC is pursuing larger institutions and those with larger
losses – as the last two rows of Table 5 show (log of) bank total assets and the size of the
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estimated FDIC loss positively impact the probability of getting sued.19 While both the size of
the bank in terms of the log of total assets and the FDIC loss are statistically significant at the
1% level, they are not the only variables that attain significance. There does not appear to be
a ”too-small-to-get-sued” effect.
In line with many of the univariate failure-indexed mean comparisons, we find that banks
whose directors and officers are sued appear to have better ROA and Tier 1 capital than
banks that are not subject to litigation, although as noted in the univariate section, it seems
likely that the higher Tier 1 capital and higher ROA are a result of the masking effect of
more aggressive asset growth and possibly slower recongnition of loan losses by the directors
and officers who are subsequently sued. The ROA ceases to be statistically significant two
quarters prior to failure. We also see a gradual rise in the predictive power of allowances for
loan losses amongst banks subject to litigation five quarters prior to failure. One difference
with the univariate analysis is that the asset growth rate is no longer consistently statistically
significant, although it remains positive and is significant in some quarters. The increased
riskiness of funding sources remains consistent with the univariate analysis, with net non-
core funding dependence remaining statistically significant at the 1% level for nine quarters
prior to failure for banks subject to litigation.
Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Are the logistic regression results useful guides for bank directors’ behaviour? Some of the
statistically significant results from the logistic regression “directors’ dozen” are not practical
for directors worried about litigation. Both a higher Tier 1 capital and ROA are associated
with a greater probability of being sued. Yet, healthy banks will also have high Tier 1 capital
and ROA. Therefore, these indicators are not helpful in and of themselves. This highlights
the limitation of the multivariate regression restricted to the population of failed banks. Thus
as a robustness check, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model on the population of all
banks, failed and surviving, to investigate whether directors can rely on the ”directors’ dozen”
to guide their decisions.
We summarize the estimation results from the Cox proportional hazard model in Table 6.
Within the wider universe of all banks, banks that fail are more likely to do so with lower Tier
19Note that, unlike the other co-variates, estimated FDIC loss is not time-varying.
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1 capital ratios (row 1). This is true for both banks that fail and whose directors and officers are
sued and those that merely fail. However, those banks seeing litigation have a lower coefficient
on this factor. Thus the risk of litigation relative to the wider universe of banks rises with a
fall in Tier 1 capital. As with the univariate means tests we find that asset growth (row 2) is
associated with the likelihood of litigation, albeit at the 10% level. The net interest income ratio
(row 9) and the net non-core funding dependence (row 10) are also associated with a greater
likelihood of litigation at the 1% level, although both measures are also associated with an
increased likelihood of bank failure without litigation. A low ROA (row 8) is associated with
banks that fail, but are not sued, whereas this factor is not statistically significant for banks
subject to litigation. A higher non-current loan ratio (row 4) is associated with banks that fail,
but are not sued, and we find that the second moment is statistically significant for banks that
are subject to litigation, which is consonant with the shifts seen in final year in the logistic
regression.
All three statistical models, univariate failure-indexed mean comparisons, logistic litigation
prediction conditional on failure as well as the proportional Cox hazard model, concur. The
FDIC appears to be pursuing directors and officers who should have been aware that they
were pursuing a risky and potentially negligent strategy: specifically, banks tending to be
underprovisioned, more reliant on net non-core funding, and posting faster asset growth.
6 Robustness
The results presented in the previous section 5 imply the FDIC litigates against agents that
take excessive risks. If such suits alter behavior, this should be apparent in the data. As a
robustness check, we consider looting as an alternative hypothesis to excessive risk taking.
If our findings are correct, we expect that FDIC litigation affects the behavior of directors
and officers of banks in response. Table 2 shows a slowing in the rate at which banks are sued
amongst the banks that fail with a dramatic fall after 2010 Q3. This may reflect time specific
shifts in banks’ patterns of behavior. Therefore, we statistically compare the out of sample
banks that failed after 2012 Q2 for evidence of a shift in behavior. Table 7 contains the results
of this comparison. In general, banks failing after 2012 Q2 hold more cash and are financed
more through deposits. This is in marked contrast with the riskier financing (net non-core
14
dependency) of the banks that are sued.
One alternative hypothesis that would also explain the litigation against directors and
officers is the possibility of looting, along the lines of Akerlof and Romer (1993). Looters find
ways to extract cash from the banks in the knowledge that regulators and prosecutors will
not take action. It is difficult to distinguish between looting and excessive risk taking, since
they have many observationally equivalent predictions or may occur concurrently (Boyd and
Hakenes, 2014).
To test for looting we examine the correlation of measures of potential cash extraction in
the financial reports. We identify the following measures that allow managers, directors and
shareholders to extract cash from the bank: dividend payments, directors fees, extensions of
credit to directors, and the ratio of interest and fee income on loans and leases to total loans.
Desai, Rajgopal, and Yu (2013) use the ratio of interest and fee income on loans and leases to
total loans to look for evidence of Akerlof and Romer (1993) looting.
Akerlof and Romer (1993) suggest that looters are difficult to detect, but if their hypothesis
is correct, it is likely that looters have extracted cash through all of the above methods. Thus,
we expect the correlation between these cash extraction methods to be high for banks whose
directors and officers are sued. We do not find evidence of statistically significant correlation
in these measures. Table 8 shows the correlation between different financial indicators as well
as our looting proxies – dividend payments, directors fees, extensions of credit to directors,
and the ratio of interest and fee income on loans and leases to total loans – four quarters prior
to failure. While Table 8 merely displays the correlations for four quarters prior to failure,
we find no evidence up to 12 quarters prior to failure of a positive correlation in the cash
extractive measures. Also, the apparent change in behaviour of banks post 2012 Q2 suggests
that banks had previously been engaged in excessive risk taking rather than being looted.
7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
We ask why does the FDIC sue some directors and officers and not others for gross negligence?
We show empirically that whether or not directors and officers of failed U.S. commercial banks
are subject to litigation ex post is partly ex ante predictable from a subset of the “directors’
dozen” indicators. Our paper is the first to statistically analyze the FDIC’s apparent motivation
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for and initial effects of its litigation strategy. Our analysis suggest a higher degree of risk
shifting (excessive risk taking) by banks of sued directors and officers, who had accelerated
asset growth whilst relying on riskier funding sources. These characteristics are identified by
Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) as indicators of persistent poor performers over two
financial crises, finding that the FDIC does pursue officers and directors of banks exhibiting
these characteristics suggests that the regulators are aware of the persistence of risk taking
behavior or cultures at banks.
A secondary question is whether the FDIC’s litigation functions as a good corporate gov-
ernance tool. Based on the balance sheet indicators in a out-of-sample peer group, our results
suggest that the FDIC’s litigation strategy does incentivise directors and officers to reduce ex-
cessively risky behaviour. From a policy viewpoint, the “directors’ dozen” tools appear to be
useful, but could probably be made more useful still. In order to make them more informa-
tive for directors, it might be helpful if each bank’s board of directors was to receive a report
showing how their institution compared to similar institutions based on spatial proximity and
size. While the aforementioned worries of the American Association of Bank Directors (2014)
about the possibility that bank directors are being put off by personal liability are important,
more details about why bank directors and officers are being sued – and the relevant statistics
being provided – likely would improve corporate governance and indeed mitigate the worries
of potential directors.
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Tables
Table 1: FDIC List of Directors’ Dozen
Name
1 Tier 1 Capital / Total Assets
2 Asset Growth Rate
3 ALLL/ Total Assets
4 Non-Current Loans / Total Assets
5 Net Charge-Offs / Total Assets
6 Provision ALLL / Total Assets
7 Earnings Coverage of Net Loss
8 Net Income / Total Assets (ROA)
9 Net Interest income / Earning Assets (NIM)
10 Net Non-Core Funding Dependence
11 Short Term Investments / Total Assets
12 Net Long-Term Position / Total Assets
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Table 2: Failed and Sued Banks by Time Period
Sued as Tolling Tolling as
Failed Sued percentage agreements percentage
of failed of sued
2007 Q1 1 0 0% 0 0%
2007 Q2 1 0 0% 0 0%
2007 Q3 0 0 0% 0 0%
2007 Q4 3 0 0% 0 0%
2008 Q1 2 1 50% 0 0%
2008 Q2 7 5 71% 0 0%
2008 Q3 10 6 60% 3 50%
2008 Q4 19 12 63% 0 0%
2009 Q1 21 13 62% 1 8%
2009 Q2 42 22 52% 4 18%
2009 Q3 37 15 41% 8 53%
2009 Q4 37 24 65% 2 8%
2010 Q1 43 21 49% 5 24%
2010 Q2 32 14 44% 1 7%
2010 Q3 27 6 22% 0 0%
2010 Q4 24 5 21% 1 20%
2011 Q1 19 2 11% 0 0%
2011 Q2 25 7 28% 0 0%
2011 Q3 18 4 22% 0 0%
2011 Q4 13 3 23% 0 0%
2012 Q1 15 1 7% 0 0%
2012 Q2 12 0 0% 0 0%
2012 Q3 8 0 0% 0 0%
2012 Q4 4 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q1 12 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q2 6 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q3 2 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q4 6 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q1 6 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q2 2 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q3 5 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q4 4 0 0% 0 0%
2015 Q1 2 0 0% 0 0%
Total 465 161 35% 25 16%
Source: FDIC
Notes: Failed banks are those that are taken into FDIC receivership as of July 31st, 2015. Sued banks are
banks whose directors and officers are subject to professional liability suits or who settle professional liability suits.
Tolling agreements are agreements that extend the three year limit on tort cases, these are derived from cases that
are filed after three years. Shaded area within the three year statute of limitations for cases to be filed.
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Table 3: Number of institutions by regulator and total number of failed and sued banks
FDIC OCC Federal Reserve Total
2007 Q1 All banks 4,782 1,704 977 7,896
Percentage 61% 22% 12%
2015 Q1 All banks 3,670 1,316 913 6,480
Percentage 57% 20% 14%
Failed 311 84 53 465
Percentage 67% 18% 11%
Sued 113 24 23 162
Percentage 70% 15% 14%
Notes: Failed banks are those that are taken into FDIC receivership as of July 31st, 2015. Sued banks are
banks whose directors and officers are subject to professional liability suits or who settle professional liability suits.
FDIC is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, OCC is Office of the Comptroller of Currency.
Table 4: Summary of Bank Level Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)
2007 Q1 2015 Q1 Failed Sued
Tier One Capital Ratio 12.2 11.7 7.3 7.6
(s.d.) 11.0 9.3 4.9 4.9
Asset Growth Rate 32.9 6.0 8.5 12.6
(s.d.) 1,283.0 19.0 63.4 43.4
ALLL Ratio 1.4 1.5 2.7 2.7
(s.d.) 1.7 1.1 2.0 2.7
Non-Current Loans Ratio 50.4 67.4 44.0 36.1
(s.d.) 19.6 16.8 16.4 16.0
Net Charge-Offs Ratio 0.2 0.1 1.9 2.4
(s.d.) 0.9 0.7 3.3 5.2
PLLL Ratio 0.2 0.1 1.5 2.2
(s.d.) 0.6 0.4 2.5 3.8
Return on Assets 1.0 1.1 -1.8 -2.0
(s.d.) 3.5 4.0 3.6 5.0
Net Interest Income Ratio 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.3
(s.d.) 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.2
Net Non-Core Funding Dependence -8.4 -13.9 31.1 36.9
(s.d.) 381.7 759.2 24.2 19.7
Short-Term Investments Ratio 10.9 10.4 8.0 6.5
(s.d.) 12.3 10.7 7.7 6.6
Log(Assets) 11.8 12.3 12.1 13.0
(s.d.) 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.2
Estimated FDIC Loss 60,287.1 186,568.9
(s.d.) 90,568.9 369,762.8
Notes: Failed banks are those that are taken into FDIC receivership. Sued banks are banks whose directors
and officers are subject to professional liability suits or who settle professional liability suits. Summary statistics
are reported from 2007 Q1 – 2015 Q1. Ratios are reported in percentages.
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Table 6: Cox Hazard Model
(1) (2)
Failed And Sued Failed Not Sued
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Tier 1 Ratio -1.764*** 0.181*** -2.674*** 0.185***
(-4.50) -3.39 (-8.85) -5.41
Asset Growth (4 Quarter) 0.568* -0.00095 -0.0385 -3.4E-05
-2.22 (-0.59) (-0.16) (-0.11)
ALLL Ratio 0.15 0.0203 -0.136 0.0900**
-0.76 -0.13 (-1.30) -3.26
Noncurrent Loan Ratio 0.0313 -0.0861*** 0.435*** -0.0232
-0.26 (-3.36) -4.77 (-1.42)
Net Charge-Off Ratio 0.425 -0.168 0.113 -0.167*
-1.57 (-1.80) -0.55 (-2.14)
PLLL Ratio -0.246 0.492*** -0.26 0.659***
(-1.19) -4.39 (-1.89) -6.42
Earnings Coverage of Net Loss 0.108 -4.7E-05 0.0788 -0.00035
-0.69 (-0.52) -0.22 (-1.23)
ROA -0.331 -0.0498 -1.647*** -0.186**
(-1.16) (-1.14) (-6.80) (-2.71)
Net Interest Income Ratio -0.826*** 0.211 -0.396* 0.0178
(-3.44) -1.27 (-2.24) -0.12
Net Noncore Funding Ratio 12.01*** -0.0177 8.742*** -0.0158
-6.1 (-1.40) -5.17 (-1.83)
Short-Term Investment Ratio -0.357 0.0179 -0.675*** 0.108**
(-1.49) -0.38 (-3.42) -3.17
Long-Term Debt Ratio -0.667*** -0.0631* -0.994*** -0.0269
(-5.18) (-2.12) (-9.37) (-1.26)
Observations 7733 7733
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figures
Figure 1: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Net Non-Core Funding Dependence
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Non-Core Funding Dependence (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Non-Core Funding Dependence
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: The difference between noncore funding and short-term investments divided by long-term assets.
Noncore funding is the sum of time deposits with balances of $100,000 or more, deposits in foreign offices and
Edge or Agreement subsidiaries, federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase,
commercial paper, other borrowings (including mortgage indebtedness and obligations under capitalized leases),
and brokered deposits less than $100,000. Short term investments are the sum of interest-bearing bank balances,
federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and debt securities with a remaining
maturity of one year or less.
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Figure 2: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Asset Growth Rate
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Asset Growth Rate
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Percentage growth in assets over the prior twelve months.
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Figure 3: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Short-Term Investments Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Short-Term Investments Ratio (Mean)
Ends in 2012 Q2
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Short-Term Investments Ratio (Median)
Ends in 2012 Q2
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Short-Term Investments Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Short term investments divided by total assets. Short term investments equals the sum of interest-
bearing bank balances, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and debt securities
with a remaining maturity of one year or less.
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Figure 4: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Net Interest Income Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Interest Income Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Interest Income Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Net interest income as a percent of average assets. Net interest income is total interest income, plus
the tax benefit on tax-exempt income, less total interest expense.
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Figure 5: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Return On Assets
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Return on Assets (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Return on Assets
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Net income divided by total assets.
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Figure 6: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Tier One Capital Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Tier One Capital Ratio (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Tier One Capital Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Tier One Capital Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Tier One capital divided by total assets.
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Figure 7: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Non-Current Loans Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Non-Current Loans Ratio (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Non-Current Loans Ratio (Median)
Ends in 2012 Q2
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Non-Current Loans Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: The sum of loans and leases 90 days or more past due, and loans and leases in nonaccrual status
divided by total loans and leases.
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Figure 8: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Provisions for Loan Losses
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
PLLL Ratio (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
PLLL Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Provisions for loan losses (year-to-date from the income statement appropriately annualized) divided
by total assets.
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Figure 9: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Allowances for Loan Losses
1
2
3
4
5
6
-12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
 
Quarters Prior to Failure
Failed Banks
Sued Banks
Failed, But Not Sued
 
Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
ALLL Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
ALLL Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Allowance for loan losses from the balance sheet divided by total bank assets
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Figure 10: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Net Charge-Offs Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Charge-Offs Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Charge-Offs Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Charge-offs minus recoveries from the income statement (year-to-date appropriately annualized)
divided by total assets.
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